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What meaning does epidemiologic evidence have for the individual? In evidence-based 
medicine, epidemiologic evidence measures the patient’s risk of the outcome or the change in 
their risk due to an intervention. The patient’s risk is commonly understood as an individual 
probability. The problem of understanding epidemiologic evidence and risk thus becomes the 
challenge of interpreting individual patient probabilities. I argue that the patient’s risk is 
interpreted ontically, as a propensity. After exploring formidable problems with this 
interpretation in the medical context, I propose an epistemic reinterpretation of individual 
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1. Problem of the Meaning of Population Evidence for the Individual 
 
Patients are not statistics. This statement is trite but true, and often underappreciated in an era 
in which medical care is driven by evidence from epidemiologic studies. The puzzle of what 
bearing group data have on individual patients is not new. It was hotly debated by physicians, 
physiologists and statisticians in the Nineteenth Century at the dawn of medical statistics 
(Matthews 1995). In the Twentieth Century, clinical trials pioneer Bradford Hill reflected that 
clinical trial results present “a group reaction. They show that one group fared better than 
another, that given a certain treatment patients, on the average, get better more frequently or 
more rapidly, or both. We cannot necessarily, perhaps very rarely, pass from that to stating 
exactly what effect the treatment will have on a particular patient” (1952, 117). 
 This problem of understanding what meaning aggregate data have for individual 
patients has gone unresolved, despite the rise of evidence-based medicine (EBM) in recent 
decades. EBM provides principles and tools to assist in the evaluation and use of 
epidemiological evidence in individual patient care. Among these tools are evidence-based 
decision aids like the graphic provided by the Mayo Clinic to help physicians and patients 
understand the results of epidemiological evidence on statins and heart attacks (Figure 1). 
Decision aids are now available for all sorts of interventions and medical conditions, from 
screening for cancer to antidepressants for depression. 
 
 
The decision aid in Figure 1 represents the risk of heart attack in a certain low-risk 
population, as well as the effect of a statin, a drug for treating cholesterol, on lowering risk. It 
is derived from clinical trials studying the effectiveness of statins. The bottom line: if a certain 
population took a statin for ten years, there would be one fewer heart attack per one hundred 
people compared to that same population if untreated (a counterfactual comparison). 
 
Figure 1. Decision aid representing the effect of a statin on risk of heart attack (Mayo Clinic 
2017). 
 If you are an individual patient (or their clinician), you ultimately want to know 
whether the statin will benefit you (or your patient). Are you a smiling green person, a 
frowning orange person, or a brimming blue person? This question is precisely not one that the 
evidence and the decision aid answers. A preferred measure of effect size in EBM is the 
number-needed-to-treat (Guyatt et al. 2015), the number of individuals a physician would need 
 
 
to treat with the intervention to prevent one outcome. The number-needed-to-treat represents 
the same kind of information captured by decision aids like Figure 1. 
 EBM tries to bridge the divide between populations and individuals using a unique 
concept of medical risk, ‘the patient’s risk’, an individual probability. The patient’s risk has 
become an important target of prognostication and treatment in healthcare (Aronowitz 2015). 
Clinicians often speak of predicting and managing risk. Indeed, preventive interventions like 
statins are understood as ‘lowing’ or ‘reducing’ one’s risk of some undesirable outcome. The 
field of risk communication sprang up to study empirically how people (especially patients 
and physicians) understand risk and to enhance discussions through tools like graphical aids – 
the psychology of risk. Yet, the meaning or interpretation of the patient’s risk as a probability 
remains virtually unexplored. Goodman, an epidemiologist, writes: “The concept of risk has 
undoubtedly become an enormously useful and essential part of medical science, but 
evidence-based medicine must grapple with the fact that in the individual patient, one of its 
pillars—the concept of probability—is ambiguous and elusive” (1999, 606). Effective risk 
communication hinges on the problem of risk interpretation, with which philosophers can be 
of some help. 
 Here, I show how EBM’s view of evidence and risk makes the problem of the meaning 
of population evidence difficult to resolve, and I propose an epistemic interpretation of 
individual patient probabilities as a corrective. In section 2, I illustrate EBM’s view of 
epidemiologic evidence qua medical evidence as measuring the patient’s risk or the change in 
 
 
the patient’s risk. I argue that the concept of the patient’s risk is interpreted ontically as a 
propensity, and that it is problematic in several ways. In section 3, I contrast the ontic 
interpretation with an epistemic (re)interpretation of individual patient probabilities as 
credences, in which epidemiologic evidence is instead seen as informing medical uncertainty. 
 
2. The Patient’s Risk as an Ontic Probability 
 
After evaluating the quality of epidemiologic evidence (e.g. the likelihood of bias), the next 
step in the EBM process is to ask, what are the results (Guyatt et al. 2015)? In prognosis, a 
measure called the absolute risk (AR), the relative frequency of the outcome, is regarded as 
perhaps the most important information a study can provide. In therapy, some measure of 
effect size like the absolute risk reduction (ARR), the difference in AR between study groups, 
is thought to be the most useful takeaway.  
On their own, these measures do not tell us how justified we are in believing that an 
individual patient will have a certain outcome or that the treatment will prevent it. Think back 
to the left-hand side of Figure 1. Once we have summarized the AR – 3% of people will have 
a heart attack – what should we infer about the patient, about whether they will have a heart 
attack? In EBM, the fact we infer is about another kind of risk, the patient’s risk. Prima facie, 
the patient’s risk is meant to connect ARs and ARRs to the patient. Says the American College 
of Cardiology evidence-based guidelines for cardiovascular disease prediction: “It is important 
 
 
to note that risk estimation is based on group averages, which are then applied to individual 
patients in practice” (Goff et al. 2014, S53; my emphasis). According to their guidelines for 
cholesterol treatment: “statin therapy is recommended for individuals at increased ASCVD 
[cardiovascular disease] risk who are most likely to experience a net benefit in terms of the 
potential for ASCVD risk reduction” (Stone et al. 2014, S7; my emphasis). Not all experts 
always agreed with this approach (recall Hill’s skepticism); nonetheless, it is the dominant 
approach in healthcare today. 
There is good reason to suspect that conceptually the patient’s risk is different from the 
absolute risk, the finite frequency in the population. For one, the patient’s risk is about an 
individual, not a population. Moreover, we can alter the patient’s risk by providing the patient 
(as opposed to the whole population) with a treatment like a statin drug. In fact, numerous 
authorities in EBM and epidemiology understand the patient’s risk as a probability (Goodman 
1999; Dulbegovic et al. 2011; Guyatt et al. 2015). Probabilities are typically considered to be 
closely linked to finite frequencies like the AR, yet distinct. The value of the patient’s risk is 
taken to equal the AR, and the value of the change in the patient’s risk due to treatment is 
taken to equal the ARR or some other AR-derived measure of the effect size. However, the 
patient’s risk is inferred from the AR, and the change in the patient’s risk due to treatment is 
inferred from the ARR.  
In Fuller and Flores (2015), we call the standard model used in EBM to make these 
inferences the Risk Generalization-Particularization (Risk GP) Model. We argue that the 
 
 
inferences rely on nontrivial and sometimes problematic assumptions. One of these 
assumptions is that the target population is a chance setup, like a lottery. We can then model 
the population using a hypothetical urn containing coloured balls. Imagine that the treated and 
untreated diagrams in Figure 1 represent two such urns. When a patient presents for risk 
assessment and treatment, it is analogous to choosing one of the two urns, randomly drawing a 
ball from it and then waiting ten years to find out what its identity will be: green (smiling) or 
orange (frowning). The single case probability that the drawn ball (patient) will be orange 
(have a heart attack) is given by the finite frequency of balls – in Figure 1, the counterfactual 
probabilities are 3% (untreated) and 2% (treated). In the next section, I will argue that we 
should interpret these probabilities epistemically. But how does EBM interpret ‘the patient’s 
risk’, which is usually equated with the probability provided by our urn model? 
 How do we interpret any probability? There are several ways of distinguishing the 
kinds of interpretations on offer, including subjective vs. objective interpretations (Gillies 
2000) and belief-type vs. frequency-type interpretations (Hacking 2001). Both these 
dichotomies separate epistemic conceptions of probability (where probability refers to an 
epistemic notion like degrees of belief or the bearing of evidence on a hypothesis) from ontic 
conceptions of probability (where probability refers to something independent of our beliefs or 
evidence like frequencies or propensities). 
 I will first consider whether EBM’s concept of the patient’s risk is interpreted 
epistemically in medicine. On this view, the patient’s risk might be a certain degree of belief 
 
 
the physician has (or should have) that the patient will develop the outcome. Or it might be the 
logical support that the proposition ‘the patient will develop the outcome’ receives. However, 
a problem arises when we try to understand what it means to say that a statin lowers the 
patient’s risk of heart attack. Seemingly, it means that the treatment causes their risk to be 
lower. On any realist theory of causation, causes exert a real effect in the world outside our 
minds. Sure, my belief that you will have a heart attack might be diminished if you take the 
medication, but the effect to which we are referring when we say that the intervention lowers 
your risk is not the effect the intervention has on my beliefs. 
 The patient’s risk is more likely an ontic concept, locating probabilities in the world. 
One such interpretation to consider is frequentism, in which probabilities are either finite or 
‘long-run’ frequencies. Yet the finite frequency just is the AR, so interpreted this way the 
patient’s risk would fail to make population data any more meaningful for the individual. 
Meanwhile, the long-run or limiting frequency would be the proportion of orange (frowning) 
balls drawn from the urn if we drew a ball randomly and then replaced it ad infinitum. That 
interpretation would only expand the population and our problem. Either variety of 
frequentism is prone to the notorious difficulty (if not outright futility) of making sense of a 
frequentist probability for a single case, and thus is not a good candidate for EBM’s singularist 
concept of the patient’s risk. 
  The most plausible classic ontic interpretation of the patient’s risk is as a propensity, a 
physical property of the single case that tends towards the outcome. Consistent with the way 
 
 
guidelines and clinicians speak about the patient’s risk, it is best conceived as their individual 
propensity towards some clinical outcome, and a lowering of the patient’s risk risk due to an 
intervention is best conceived as a change in that propensity. The value of the patient’s risk 
would then represent the strength of that propensity or the frequency of the outcome that the 
propensity manifests. Many philosophers are quite comfortable ascribing propensities to 
radioactive atoms or coin-tossings, but are clinical outcomes genuinely chancy in this way? 
 Clinical outcomes result from biomedical mechanisms. For example, heart attacks 
result from coronary atherosclerosis, the buildup of a fatty plaque in the innermost layer of the 
coronary arteries supplying the heart due to the accumulation of LDL-cholesterol. A heart 
attack usually results from plaque rupture, leading to a blood clot that cuts off blood flow to 
heart muscle and deprives it of oxygen. A statin is thought to work by lowering LDL-
cholesterol (among other potential effects). To say that outcomes like heart attack and statin 
prevention are chancy is to suggest that pathogenic mechanisms like these are chancy, which 
is far from accepted or obvious. Thus, the first difficulty for the propensity interpretation is 
that the existence of propensities for clinical outcomes (never mind macro-level outcomes 
generally) is not a given. 
 Viewing epidemiologic evidence as measuring propensities invites further problems. 
Firstly, the aggregate propensity or the change in aggregate propensity in an epidemiologic 
population may be an unreliable estimate of individual propensities or changes in propensity, 
respectively. As a measure of propensity, the AR would first and foremost be a measure of 
 
 
aggregate or average propensity in a population. A propensity theory for medicine would have 
to assume that different patients have different propensities because ARs generally vary by 
clinical subpopulation according to risk factors. The question is whether the aggregate 
propensity is a good estimate of the individual propensity for most individuals. Similarly, the 
ARR would be a measure of the aggregate reduction in propensity in a population. As the 
individual treatment effect can vary among members of the population (Kravitz et al. 2004), 
we should wonder whether the aggregate change in propensity is a good estimate for most 
individuals. 
 Whether or not an aggregate propensity (or change in propensity) is a good estimate 
for most individuals depends on the distribution of individual propensities (or changes in 
propensity) in the population. If the distribution is narrow and unimodal, then the true value 
for most individuals will cluster around the mean, so that the aggregate will usually be a pretty 
good estimate for the individual. If the distribution is not narrow or not unimodal, then many 
individuals will cluster away from the mean, and the aggregate will often be a poor estimate 
for the individual. As an illustration, if the clinical outcome is fully determined rather than 
governed by propensities, then individual probabilities and reductions in probability will only 
have two values, 0 or 100%, which means that the AR or ARR is aggregating an extreme 
bimodal distribution. What kind of distribution typically occurs in medicine? 
 It is difficult to know because virtually the only information we have about risks comes 
from aggregate studies. We do know (for instance) that the AR of heart attack or stroke will 
 
 
vary widely from less than 1% to over 50% in common subgroups of patients (Goff et al. 
2014), which suggests a large spread of cardiovascular propensities in the population. We 
have tools to further stratify patient risk, but not down to the level of the individual. In general, 
we should worry that any AR and ARR might be a poor estimate for the individual unless we 
have evidence to suggest otherwise. 
 One reason to treat this possibility as worrisome is that assuming that the aggregate is a 
good estimate for all individuals has two alarming consequences if we are mistaken. First, we 
ascribe a definite non-zero individual risk to everyone. Because individual risks are 
increasingly treated as diseases in their own right (Aronowitz 2015), this ascription turns 
everyone into a patient (e.g. a ‘cardiovascular risk patient’) with an individual risk that might 
need monitoring and intervention. Moreover, we assign a non-zero potential individual risk 
reduction to everyone, which makes it appear as though the intervention is universally 
effective – everyone stands to benefit by having their own risk lowered. The assumption of an 
equal distribution of individual risk and risk reduction could lead to high healthcare anxiety, 
high healthcare utilization and costs, and overtreatment. 
 The final problem with EBM’s view of epidemiologic evidence as measuring 
individual risks-as-propensities is that individual propensities are just not what epidemiologic 
studies directly measure, even if it turns out that some of the time an epidemiologic study’s 
results accidentally provide a good approximation of individual propensities. A 3% individual 
propensity towards heart attack is a property of the individual, analogous to a 100-faced die 
 
 
that has a 3% propensity towards rolling orange because three of its hundred faces are orange. 
We infer that there is a 3% probability of rolling orange by studying the die’s properties 
(number of faces, weighting, symmetry). In contrast, we modeled our epidemiologic study 
results as an urn containing balls. We infer that there is a 3% probability that the ball we have 
drawn is orange not from facts about this ball but from the frequency of orange balls in the 
urn. How then should we interpret this individual probability? 
 In summary, the patient’s risk is interpreted ontically in EBM, as a propensity. I am not 
denying that there might be clinical propensities, and the alternative I will now propose is 
agnostic to their existence. However, EBM’s concept of the patient’s risk faces serious 
problems: the existence of clinical propensities is not a given, aggregate epidemiologic 
outcomes might be a poor estimate of them (which could lead to overdiagnosis of individual 
risk and overtreatment), and they are not what epidemiologic evidence directly measures. 
Rather than individual propensities (‘the patient’s risk’), EBM should reconceive of the role of 
epidemiologic evidence as supplying epistemic patient probabilities. 
 
3. An Epistemic Reinterpretation 
 
To provide a head-to-head comparison between EBM’s interpretation of individual patient 
probabilities and the interpretation I endorse, I will follow EBM in assuming that 
epidemiologic studies measure ARs and effect size statistics derived from the AR like the 
 
 
ARR. I will further follow EBM in inferring individual patient probabilities that are equal in 
value to the AR. I am not necessarily advocating this approach, but I will provide a better 
interpretation of these probabilities if we do choose to infer them.  
The implicit interpretation of these probabilities in EBM is ontic: the patient’s risk as 
something mind-independent, most likely a propensity. Assuming you are a member of the 
untreated population represented in Figure 1, your individual risk or propensity of having a 
heart attack in the next ten years is 3%. The virtue of a statin is that it lowers your propensity 
of heart attack from 3% to 2%. In comparison, an epistemic interpretation of these 
probabilities sees them as the probability of a hypothesis about you. The relevant prognostic 
hypothesis is H: you will have a heart attack in the next ten years if untreated. The 
epidemiologic evidence represented in Figure 1 can be viewed as providing probabilistic 
support for this hypothesis: 3% represents the probability of H conditional on the evidence E 
(p(H|E) = AR).  
There are various epistemic interpretations on the menu, including classical, logical 
and credence varieties (Gillies 2000). I will endorse interpreting patient probabilities as 
(rational) credences or degrees of belief over other epistemic interpretations for several 
reasons. First, credence is currently the leading contender among epistemic interpretations in 
philosophy, statistics and medicine. Thinking about credences in prognosis and therapy might 
not be a huge conceptual leap for EBM, as Bayesian inference is commonplace in evidence-
based diagnosis (Guyatt et al. 2015). Moreover, uncertainty is widely recognized in medicine 
 
 
as an important feature of clinical reasoning and decision-making (Djulbegovic et al. 2011; 
Tonelli & Upshur 2018). Medical evidence is often seen as having some bearing on medical 
uncertainty, hopefully reducing it by providing new information, but sometimes increasing it 
by challenging existing thinking. Credences are a ready and useful way of representing 
uncertainty. Epidemiological evidence informs uncertainty by grounding our credences in 
frequencies. 
Lastly, a credence interpretation is well suited to our probability model: an urn 
containing coloured balls. We have drawn a ball randomly from the untreated urn in Figure 1. 
The probability that we have drawn an orange (frowning) ball is 3%, which can be interpreted 
as our credence that the ball is orange given evidence of the frequency of orange balls in the 
urn. I do not mean that this credence is the one that a particular physician will have, 
descriptively speaking. I mean that it is the rational credence we ought to adopt if the 
epidemiologic evidence is our evidence. Asserting E as our evidence makes several 
assumptions beyond the important one that we have no independent evidence1 (these 
 
1 If we do have ‘independent evidence’ (evidence not bearing on E itself), our epidemiologic 
credence could still be regarded as rational if we treat it as our prior probability that we can 
then update using the independent evidence. We might also have ‘non-independent evidence’ 
(bearing on E itself), supporting the assumptions upon which E relies, for instance the 
assumption that the clinical trial population is representative of the target population. 
 
 
assumptions are explored in Fuller & Flores 2015). It amounts to claiming that our probability 
model represents our patient and our patient population well enough. If we grant these 
assumptions, the justification for setting our credence to the AR can be provided by one of 
several rational principles, including the Principal Principle (Lewis 1980) or the Principle of 
Direct Probability (Hacking 2001). I do not have space to discuss these principles here. 
In section 2, I raised the concern that because their populations are heterogeneous, 
epidemiologic studies might provide an inaccurate estimate of the patient’s true individual 
propensity. Our rational credence cannot be inaccurate in the same way as the propensity 
estimate because it is not intended as some ideal credence equal to the patient’s propensity. It 
rather represents our uncertainty given variability in the outcome in the population, captured 
by the aggregate outcome. Some of this variability may be due to stochasticity: the outcome 
might actually be governed by propensities. However, some of the variability also results from 
causal heterogeneity. The study’s aggregate outcome packages together any genuine 
stochasticity with causal heterogeneity. Its weakness in estimating an individual propensity is 
simultaneously its strength in serving to represent the physician’s uncertainty to the extent that 
the physician does not know where in the propensity distribution the particular patient is 
located. 
In section 2, I rejected an epistemic interpretation of the patient’s risk because it is 
unfaithful to how the concept is used in practice. Physicians speak of lowering the patient’s 
risk with an intervention, which is best understood as a causal effect of the intervention on the 
 
 
patient rather than its effect on our beliefs. Similarly, the ARR and other measures of effect 
size present a challenge for my epistemic alternative to the patient’s risk. How can our 
credences reflect the causal import of the ARR, which measures not just a difference in 
frequencies but a difference caused by the intervention? 
One tantalizing possibility is suggested by the depiction of the brimming blue person 
in Figure 1. The decision aid assumes that the ARR of 1% reveals the frequency of individuals 
for whom the statin prevented a heart attack. We might then infer that the probability that this 
patient –presenting randomly from the population – will have their heart attack prevented by a 
statin is 1%. This probability could be interpreted as our credence in the hypothesis that a 
statin will prevent a heart attack for the patient. 
Unfortunately, the decision aid goes beyond the trial evidence in ways that might not 
be justified. The trials simply determined that a statin reduced the frequency of heart attack by 
1% on net. It could be that the statin prevented a heart attack in 1%, but it could instead be (for 
instance) that a statin caused a heart attack in 2% while preventing one in 3%. These sorts of 
opposite or ‘paradoxical’ effects sometimes occur in medicine, like when an anticoagulant 
prevents death in one person by preventing stroke but causes death in another by producing a 
major gastrointestinal bleed, or when an antibiotic prevents death in one by treating a life-
threatening infection but causes death in another by triggering anaphylaxis. Furthermore, there 
may be nobody in the trial for whom the statin prevented a heart attack in the deterministic 
counterfactual sense of causing the absence of a heart attack when one otherwise would have 
 
 
occurred. It could be that a statin lowered the chance of a heart attack in one or more 
individuals who otherwise would have had a chance of heart attack less than one. If we do not 
wish to rule out the possibility of paradoxical effects or chancy causation, we must depart 
from the decision aid’s belief in the one blue person. 
Thankfully, we do not need this additional assumption to make clinical trial evidence 
meaningful on an epistemic interpretation. Our urn model provides the answer. The two urns 
in Figure 1 generate two epistemic probabilities: cr(H|E&untreated) and cr(H|E&treated). 
Some of the epidemiologic evidence in E comes from cohort studies that followed populations 
of patients over time and measured the untreated AR: these studies are evidence for the 
frequency in the untreated urn. However, some of the evidence in E comes from clinical trials 
that measured the effect size (e.g. the ARR). The effect size allows us to predict the frequency 
in the treated urn from the frequency in the untreated urn because it quantifies the difference 
that the intervention makes in the population. Thus, our credences reflect relevant causal facts 
because they are conditional partly on causal evidence (from clinical trials). We can thus make 
a rational decision about whether to use the intervention partly by comparing our treated and 
untreated credences. 
 An epistemic interpretation provides at least a partial solution to the problem of the 
meaning of population evidence for the individual. It does so by providing a meaning or 
interpretation of the individual probabilities that epidemiologic evidence supplies: they 
represent our rational credence conditional on the evidence (and on several assumptions). 
 
 
Rather than measuring individual propensities (the patient’s risk), the role of epidemiologic 
evidence qua medical evidence is to inform medical uncertainty. The greatest benefit of the 
epistemic interpretation may be that it avoids the problems of the propensity interpretation 
discussed in section 2.  
The epistemic interpretation has the additional benefit of restoring the importance of 
clinical judgment and expertise as well as the epistemic function of evidence to our 
understanding of epidemiologic evidence in medicine. In its quest for objectivity, EBM has 
divorced epidemiologic evidence from clinical expertise and from epistemic warrant: 
epidemiologic evidence measures facts about individuals rather than providing epistemic 
support for hypotheses. Yet, patients go their physician in part for the physician’s medical 
opinion, their expert probability assignment. This epistemic probability need not be baseless; it 
should be grounded in objective facts supplied by evidence to allow for rational decision-
making. Similarly, we need not dispense with decision-aids, which are often a helpful way of 
representing the evidence on which our credence is based. However, the evidence and the 
decision aids require interpretation to make them meaningful for the individual, and here the 
language of uncertainty should replace talk of the patient’s risk.  
 On the other hand, part of the problem of the meaning of population evidence for the 
individual remains unresolved. Our evidence-based credence is set to the AR – a fact about the 
population – rather than reflecting facts particular to the person. The more relevant facts the 
population shares with a particular person, the more relevant the population evidence will be 
 
 
for that person. However, regardless of how relevant some population evidence is, my 
epistemic proposal at least makes this evidence interpretable for “a science of uncertainty and 
an art of probability”2. 
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